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Abstract  
Given the magnitude of transport-problems in many large cities, the potential of rivers to 
serve as transport arteries is being recognized once again. However, some world cities, such 
as Paris, have failed to maximize their river potential. The Seine remains underutilized by 
mass commuter ferries serving the local population. Why, in the modern era, has Paris not 
taken advantage of its river for commuter transport? Will it do so in the future? This article 
answers these questions, which are important at the present time of grave sustainability 
concerns. The identified barriers include: (a) funding constraints; (b) competition by other 
modes; (c) lack of political and institutional will; (d) lack of opportunity; (e) local legislation; 
and (f) technical issues. The first three are common worldwide while the last three are 
specific to Paris.  
 
 
 
Sous le pont Mirabeau coule la Seine, et nos amours… 
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-- Guillaume Apollinaire, 1912 
I. Introduction 
Historically, major cities were built near rivers. There are many reasons for this, but a 
principal one is that rivers allowed for water transport. Prior to the invention of trains and 
cars, water transport was much faster, and often cheaper, than land transportation, which 
relied on carriages drawn by animals. Cities with access to water were in a much better 
position than landlocked cities to develop trade with neighbors and thus sustain their economy 
(Kostof 1992).  
In the mid-19
th 
century, a series of factors conspired to lead to the decline of water-based 
transport. One was the shift in primary energy sources from wood to coal, which boosted the 
use of railways. Another was the emergence of bridges and tunnels that replaced most cross-
river services. The pollution, diseases, and environmental degradation of rivers due to 
rampant industrialization further contributed to the demise of waterfronts. In the 1950s, the 
automobile boomed and abandoned riverfronts became premium locations to build concrete 
highways. For decades to come, these stood as polluted, noisy, and impassable barriers 
between the city and its river. By the 1970s, many cities had turned their backs to their rivers 
(Freemark 2010).  
Now, at the height of the urban revival movement, cities are rediscovering their river assets. 
With de-industrialization and the rise of “containerization” in shipping, upriver ports have 
been replaced with large downriver facilities able to accommodate large ships, thus freeing up 
urban waterfronts (Tanko and Burke 2017). Environmental awareness, globalization, and an 
emphasis on “quality of life” has triggered waterfront revitalization movements, first in the 
US, then in Europe and the rest of the world (Lechner 2006). These projects are taking place 
in derelict docklands, which are re-emerging as gentrified and densified commercial and 
residential hubs that attempt to bring “blue space” closer to urbanites (Romain 2010). Places 
are consciously reimaging or rebranding themselves as “river cities” in order to promote 
tourism and deliver a unique experience to visitors (Tanko and Burke 2017).  
Given the magnitude of transport-problems in many large cities, the potential of uncongested 
rivers to serve as transport arteries is being recognized once again. World cites as far apart as 
New York and San Francisco (North America), Sydney and Brisbane (Australia), Bangkok 
(Asia), and London, Copenhagen, Gothenburg, Hamburg, and Stockholm (Europe) have 
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already put in place linear ferry commuter services, which have been rather successful 
(Camay et al. 2012; Soltani et al. 2015). Their introduction has been assisted by recent 
advances in maritime technology, including higher speed, high capacity, and low wake 
vessels that are more suitable for urban use (Tanko and Burke 2017). Now Abu Dhabi, 
Washington DC and Melbourne are considering the introduction of ferry services.  
Meanwhile, other cities, such as Paris, have failed to maximize their river potential. The Paris 
basin is crossed by the Seine, a major navigable waterway. In terms of land use, the latest 
masterplan identifies riverine suburbs as future growth areas. However, in terms of transport, 
public authorities have focused on rail- and road-based options. The largest European 
transport mega-project, Grand Paris Express, which was launched in 2014, does not include 
river transport solutions.
1
 The Seine remains underutilized by mass commuter ferries serving 
the local population.  
Why, in the modern era, has Paris not taken advantage of its river for commuter transport? 
Will it do so in the future? This article aims to provide answers to these questions, which are 
important at the present time of grave environmental, economic, and social sustainability 
concerns. A discussion of this neglected mode, and with a focus on future implementation, 
will close a gap in the academic literature. To provide greater insight into the barriers 
preventing Paris from taking advantage of the Seine, the Parisian case study is benchmarked 
against London, a city in which urban passenger ferry services have boomed in recent years. 
Among the places with successful contemporary ferry systems, London is the most similar to 
Paris in terms of size,
2
 culture, and global presence. Moreover, the two cities are 
“competitors” but the respective planning authorities have been known to examine and 
borrow each other’s policies from time to time. Benchmarking has revealed issues that would 
have been ignored while focusing on a single case study.  
II. Literature Review: Features of Contemporary Urban Passenger Ferry 
Systems 
The key characteristics and available information on existing systems have been summarized 
by other authors (see Tanko and Burke 2017; Burke and Sipe 2014). Existing studies have 
                                               
1
 A casual observer might believe otherwise, given the traffic generated by ocean liners carrying freight and by 
tourist cruise boats. Recently much fanfare has been generated around the futuristic proposal of Sea Bubbles: 
small, electric or solar vehicles which can fly, float, and sail on the river. However, even if put into use, Sea 
Bubbles will carry only four passengers at a time. 
2 With 7 (vs. 8.6) million inhabitants in the metropolitan region.  
  
4 
found that systems vary by vessel and terminal type, by service frequency and scale, and by 
the urban context in which they operate. Vessels range from high speed catamarans to 
monohulls, with capacity between 60 and 298 passengers. Some can even accommodate 
bicycles on board. Systems can have just one main route which runs parallel to the shore or 
criss-crosses the river, or a network of complementary routes with transfer points. The total 
route length varies between 6 and 31 km.  
The adoption of urban passenger ferry systems can benefit the public and private sectors alike, 
as well as users. From the perspective of the public sector, waterborne transport systems, 
especially those which avail of new, fast technologies, can help alleviate road congestion 
(Camay et al. 2012). Contemporary ferries are more eco-friendly than their land-based 
counterparts. Customized technologies make them more fuel efficient and reduce engine 
exhaust and noise pollution. The use of green technologies, such as electricity and hydraulic 
propulsion, is increasing (CEREMA 2016).  
Ferries employ an existing natural element (the river) and thus need little extra space or 
infrastructure. This allows for greater service flexibility than rail. New stops with adequate 
docking facilities can be added much more easily along a ferry route than along a metro route 
(Thompson et al. 2006). However, it must be noted that, if ferries are purely a private sector 
innovation, the systems risk developing separately from other public transport in the city. As 
such, they may be poorly integrated, and may struggle to modernize (Tanko and Burke 2017).  
In crisis situations, water transportation has proven to be invaluable. For example, in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and Hurricane Sandy in New York, ferries were used to provide assistance 
to isolated city dwellers. Ferries are more resilient to natural hazards due to their water-based 
location (Sipe and Burke 2014). However, where ferry systems are on rivers (rather than 
harbors or estuaries) they are very prone to flooding and less resilient. For example, in 
Brisbane, key terminals were out of operation for many months after the 2009 floods when all 
other city transit was back in operating within days.  
A benefit for the private sector is the spurring economic development, particularly residential 
and commercial redevelopment – both small and large scale. For example, a recent study in 
New York concluded that ferry services have had a positive impact on property values (which 
have increased up to 8%) and the pace of development along their route (NYCEDC 2013). In 
Bangkok, terminals are being modernized and equipped with stores, eateries, and ATMs. In 
fact, many urban linear ferry systems would not have been implemented, had they not served 
an economic function, in addition to transporting people (Tanko and Burke 2017; Sipe and 
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Burke 2011). Recognizing ferries’ role in stimulating land value uplift, some developers have 
been willing to pay for terminals and even subsidize fares (Tanko and Burke 2017).  
From the perspective of the public, ferries can provide pleasant, safe, secure, quick, and 
comfortable journeys. Many regular users attach a greater amenity value to linear ferry 
transport beyond its utilitarian transport function. Ferries have also been used to provide 
strategic access to “transit deserts” – for example, low-income areas – that are not served by 
existing land-based services (Tanko and Burke 2017). In this case, ferries fill a void, without 
competing with other public transport operations. In some cities, ferries have become an icon 
and a tourist attraction – whether purposefully or not (Tanko and Burke 2017).  
Notwithstanding these advantages, major barriers stand in the way of ferry systems’ adoption 
in some river cities. If extensive and efficient land-based transit options exist, fierce 
competition with those other modes precludes the inclusion of ferries in the transport system. 
Ferries are at a disadvantage compared to heavy rail as they can offer less frequent services 
and insignificant savings in travel time (Camay et al. 2012). At the same time, ferries have a 
high cost of operation. Estimates for London indicate that the operating costs of ferry services 
on the River Thames are around £8.4 per km compared to £2.5 for buses and £35 for the 
subway (the Tube). Per unit, ferry services require more staff and fuel than buses and metros, 
and therefore, their operation requires financial subsidies from public transport authorities 
(Buchanan et al. 2009). Often, a strong political champion is crucial in triggering policy 
change in favor of ferries (Tanko 2015).  
Moreover, ferries can only serve land-uses which are adjacent to the river. This limits their 
impact and catchment area. Clearly, the success of new waterfront development projects does 
not completely rely on their access to a ferry terminal, epitomizing a perfect ferry-oriented 
development. Developers and home buyers will have other motivations for choosing a 
riverine location, including nice, open views and pleasant summer breezes (Sipe and Burke 
2011). But, while piers in themselves might not “cause” future development, the transit option 
that they offer certainly increases their attraction. Therefore, in some riverfront neighborhoods 
which already have a population threshold sufficient to sustain an effective service, 
commercial developers and businesses have lobbied for, and participated in, the funding of 
new pier infrastructure, as noted (Buchanan et al. 2009; Sipe and Burke 2011). In others, such 
funding (expected from the public sector) has not been forthcoming.  
A few strategies have been proposed to tackle these issues. One solution is to route ferry 
services so that they address the needs of both commuters and tourists. To ensure coordinated 
  
6 
routing, scheduling, and ticketing, river services must be integrated with the overall regional 
transport strategy and planning (Sipe and Burke 2011). On a broader scale, ferry services 
must be integrated into the overall economic plan of the city to ensure their economic viability 
(NYCEDC 2013). As with other planning initiatives, stakeholder engagement and sensitivity 
to the local context are important. Marketing and branding has a prime role in captivating city 
dwellers in a way that shifts their preferred transportation mode towards ferries (NYCEDC 
2013).  
III. Methodology   
The historical backdrop of waterborne passenger lines in Paris and London, and the data and 
analysis, are provided below. As noted, the authors use London as a benchmark for 
comparison purposes, while Paris constitutes the main subject of study. Other systems are also 
mentioned ad hoc, to illustrate and reinforce important points.  
Conceptualization  
“Benchmarking” is a continuous and non-coercive process of comparison that catalyzes 
learning, improvement, and innovation (Zairy and Whymark 2000; Anand 2008). The concept 
was first developed in the late 1970s in the private sector and then expanded to other fields, 
including urban and transportation planning (Georgiadis 2012). Now, knowledge-sharing is 
among the main activities of the European Union. Under its sustainable mobility agenda, the 
EU has financed several benchmarking programs to improve urban transport services 
(Gudmundsson 2003). Benchmarking can focus on both positive outcomes and the processes 
needed to achieve those outcomes (Georgiadis 2012). Knowledge of the local context is key 
in a benchmark analysis, as contextual differences (economic, political, or social) often 
prevent the transfer of policies from a more advanced benchmark city – such as London, in 
this case. Even where a direct transfer of policies is not possible, benchmarking is still useful 
as it raises new issues and provides a fresh perspective to policy makers (Stead and Pojani 
2014; Gudmundsson 2003).  
The Benchmark: London 
The River Thames and its tributaries flow through 16 boroughs of Greater London for about 
70km. Thames has always been a major thoroughfare, supporting London’s mercantile 
hegemony in the 18
th
 century and catering to passenger services. The latter was crucial since 
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for centuries there was just one crossing point across the River Thames: the London Bridge. 
The use of the river as a means of public transportation increased rapidly after the 
introduction of steamboats in 1815, and ferry services were preferred to rail. By the end of the 
century, after the construction of the Tube begun in 1863, the river’s popularity declined and 
the London steamboat company eventually declared bankruptcy (TL 2016). Later, throughout 
the 20
th
 century, a dozen public and private ferry systems (river buses) were introduced, but 
only one operated for more than a couple of years: the RG Odell service (1946-1966) that 
connected Kew and Greenwich (30 minutes) (Buchanan et al. 2010). By the 1970s, with the 
demise of the RG Odell Company and the containerization of the shipping industry, the 
waterfront became obsolete.  
However, in the 1980s, following the urban revival movement, the Docklands area was 
gradually redeveloped into a vibrant commercial, light industrial, and residential 
neighborhood. Revitalized riverside precincts, such as the O2 Arena and Canary Wharf, 
became international showcase projects. Consequently, interest in the river greatly renewed 
(TL 2015b). Initially, a limited private ferry service was set up in 1988 by a consortium of 
four Docklands property developers. It connected Canary Wharf, Central London, and 
Chelsea Harbour, at a time when public transportation options were very limited. In 1992, the 
system served 750,000 passengers. However, in the fifth year of operation, the economic 
downturn put its businesses sponsors in jeopardy and without alternative funding, the system 
collapsed (Long Branch 2016).  
The current system, the Thames Clippers, began operation in 1999. Initially, it encompassed a 
minuscule fleet, employed existing, small and simple piers, and only provided limited 
commuter services (between Savoy and Greenwich). The waterborne line encountered success 
and ridership grew steadily (Long Branch 2016). By the mid-2010s, the lines multiplied to 
four (with 20 stops) and the fleet grew to 15 high-speed catamarans with a capacity of 65 to 
200 passengers each. Expansion plans are ongoing and private financing has been secured for 
this purpose. Commuter services run from 6am to 9pm with a 20 minutes frequency during 
peak hours. Since 2009, the services have been integrated within the greater transport network 
of London, allowing passengers to use Oyster transit cards on the ferries as well.  
Now commuter ferries are a beloved mode in London. This was demonstrated during an 
incident in 2009, when the Transport for London agency briefly removed the river artery from 
the transit map, provoking violent reactions (Long Branch 2016). The pace of growth in 
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passenger journeys is still rising. In 2014, the Thames Clippers served more than 10 million 
passengers (TL 2015b).  
The Subject: Paris  
The River Seine runs across the Greater Paris region for about 50km. Canals and tributaries, 
such as the River Marne, are also navigable. The width of the river varies from 30 to 200m. 
The Seine has served as a thoroughfare to transport goods and people since the Middle Ages. 
At the start of the 19
th
 century, paddle steamers replaced horse-drawn boats, which had been 
in use for at least four hundred years. Navigation became more rapid and efficient and 
services became more frequent. To cope with increased traffic, mitigate floods, and control 
the water flow, canals and floodgates were built and the riverbanks were reinforced 
(Poudevigne et al. 2002). In 1886, the Compagnie Générale des Bateaux Parisiens was 
formed. At its peak in 1900, the CGBP operated four lines, offering services from 5am to 8pm 
with a 10 minute headway. Its boats could accommodate 300-400 passengers. But with the 
advent of rail transport, which attracted passengers en masse, the company was forced to 
close in 1917. After a final attempt (1921-1934), all passenger services on the river stopped. 
The attention switched from outmoded ferries to the promising state-of-the-art Métro - 
inaugurated in 1900 during the Paris World Fair (Duhau 2009). However, the Seine remained 
a major route for freight transport. Today, the Port de Paris remains the second largest fluvial 
port in Europe, processing over 21 million tons of freight annually. At the end of the 1980s, 
tourist ferry services were launched - the well-known bateau-mouches and other vedettes.  
In 2007, a free ferry service for commuters (Mobil’Icade) was set up by a private 
development company (Icade) to connect Parc de la Villette and Millénaire, two new business 
and residential hubs along the Canal Saint-Denis. Following Mobil’Icade’s popularity (4000 
weekly commuters served), the concept of river-based public transport resurfaced on STIF’s 
agenda. STIF (Syndicat des Transports d’Île-de-France) is the main transport authority in the 
Paris region (Île-de-France). In 2007, it proposed the introduction of Voguéo, a publicly run 
commuter ferry service, which was to resuscitate CGBP’s old routes (3 lines and 31 stops). 
During its trial period (2008-2011), Voguéo ran between 7am and 8.30pm with a headway of 
15-20 minutes, and carried 1,000 passengers/day on average (STIF 2012). At the end of the 
trial period, the company was tendered out. A single bid was received (by Batobus); the 
exorbitant asking price was ultimately rejected. This signaled Voguéo’s end (STIF 2013). 
Since then, no effort has been made to reintroduce passenger ferry services along the Seine.  
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Data and Analysis  
To examine the barriers to the creation of a passenger ferry system in Paris, as well as the 
potential lessons from London, online questionnaires were sent to public sector planners in 
Paris, who were occupied key positions in transport agencies. The sampling was snowball and 
the questionnaire included ten open-ended questions (see the Appendix). Five completed 
questionnaires were received (written in French, later translated into English). This was a 
representative sample across different types of key actors in state agencies. Given the focused 
nature of the study, and the dearth of specialists in passenger ferry transport (especially in a 
context where ferry transport has not been adopted), this sample was deemed sufficient for 
saturation, answering the research questions, and garnering insights into the issues under 
investigation. The responses were analyzed and interpreted based on authors’ knowledge of 
the local context. The London case was researched through site visits and a thorough a 
thorough review of official reports and academic papers (including: Barker and Robbins 
1974; Buchanan et al. 2009; TL 2013, 2015a, 2015b, 2016; ODA 2012; UITP 2015). The 
findings are reported below.  
IV. Findings: Barriers to the Creation of a Commuter Ferry System in 
Paris  
Most respondents were pessimistic about a possible re-introduction of commuter ferry 
services in Paris. The identified barriers included: (a) funding constraints; (b) competition by 
other modes; (c) lack of political and institutional will; (d) lack of opportunity; (e) local 
legislation; and (f) technical issues. The first three are common worldwide, as noted, while 
the last three are specific to Paris. The study revealed that, while the Thames Clippers 
experience was reviewed during the Voguéo trial, London is generally considered too 
different from Paris in terms of its transport finance and governance systems to serve as a role 
model. This type of attitude (“we are unique”) is common among high-status capital cities 
(Pojani and Stead 2014). The barriers identified in Paris are discussed below, and compared to 
the case of London.  
Funding Constraints  
Fortuitous timing in terms of budget has, in some cases, ben key in implementing new ferry 
systems – apart from modest ones that do not require financial ingenuity (Tanko and Burke 
2017). All the respondents agreed that the high cost of river-based public transport is the 
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principal factor that hinders implementation in Paris. While capital costs are lower than for 
rail, operating costs, including staff salaries, maintenance and repairs, energy consumption, 
and ticket subsidies are substantially higher. Staff and maintenance expenditures impose the 
greatest burden. To operate a unit and ensure the security and safety of its passengers, more 
staff is required on boats than in metros or buses. French law requires that a crew of at least 
two members (usually a pilot and a seaman) be present on vessels carrying more than nine 
passengers. A larger crew is required for vessels carrying more than 250 passengers (CERTU 
2012). Crewing sizes have been a concern for water transit system design in other cities as 
well. Copenhagen modified its vessel design in order to obtain approval for single-crewing 
operations (Tanko and Burke 2017). 
Given current technologies in use, fuel consumption is higher for boats than for buses (UITP 
2015). Therefore, to maximize fuel efficiency, vessels must operate at high speeds, offer 
frequent service, and carry the upper limit number of passengers at all times. This is the 
approach adopted in London (Buchanan 2009). In France, on the other hand, allowed ferry 
speed limits are rather low (see later). In the case of Voguéo, the annual operating costs at the 
legal speed limit (only 5 knots in the inner city and 8 knots elsewhere) and given a high-
frequency service were as high as 16.5 million Euros.  
Finally, in France the population embraces a deep-rooted belief that transport infrastructure 
and services must be publicly funded. A typical Parisian commuter pays only 30% of the cost 
of his/her journeys, while STIF subsidizes the rest through funding it receives from local 
taxation and transfers upper levels of government (STIF 2015). Voguéo, for example, was far 
from self-sufficient in terms of operational income. Transport funding from the private sector 
is not forthcoming because its members feel that they are already overburdened by business 
taxes which are then used to carry out public works, including transport infrastructure. Under 
these circumstances, transport authorities are constantly under financial pressure. With the 
Grand Paris Express at the forefront of the political and institutional agenda until 2030, funds 
are scarce for operational subsidies to lower-priority modes such as river ferries.  
By contrast, in London, in a context of a retreating government and limited public subsidies, 
alternative funding sources were sought since the inception of the ferry system (Buchanan et 
al. 2009). First, the system is private and based on a user-payer principle. Commuting 
Londoners pay much higher out-of-pocket fees than commuting Parisians. While this helps 
cover the operating costs more fully, it also imposes a significant burden on less affluent 
passengers (Prédali and Gloaguen 2014). In addition to user fees, the private sector is another 
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chief supporter of the Thames Clippers. Here, private businesses financed the construction of 
the piers and the upgrades of existing infrastructure – but only where the river ferry services 
were aligned with their strategies. In 2005, the Anschutz Entertainment Group acquired both 
the Millennium Dome (the entertainment complex O2) and the Thames Clippers, the fleet of 
which it enlarged with six new catamarans to improve access to the venue (Buchanan et al. 
2010).  
While the coordination of land use and transport development is extremely beneficial in 
planning, a typical conflict emerges when the private sector is involved in transport financing: 
its motivations are driven solely by profit while public transport is, at least in theory, a public 
good that serves unprofitable locations as well. Moreover, massive, privately-led 
redevelopment projects in waterfront locations have sparked major controversies. Critics have 
argued that urban vistas and nature (i.e., rivers) are public goods to which the entire 
population must have access. Also, the gentrification processes which some redeveloped 
waterfronts have experienced have been detrimental to impoverished long-term residents.  
The London river ferry services receive additional income from small businesses (shops and 
cafés) which rent space on piers, and from advertisements on vessels and at piers. For 
example, recently, the Thames Clippers entered into a partnership with a credit company 
(MBNA) which funded the acquisition of two new vessels in return for highly-visible 
advertisement space on vessels (UITP 2015). These types of partnerships have not been 
considered in Paris. While the presence of small businesses might be convenient and desirable 
at piers, arguments have been advanced against covering public transport vehicles (including 
ferries) with visually polluting advertisements.  
Competition by Other Modes 
Paris encompasses a dense and high-performing network of land-based modes (Chakhtoura 
and Pojani 2016). Respondents highlighted the fact that ferry systems face fierce and 
unequitable competition here. If ferries are to cater to as many passengers as a bus or a metro, 
the headways between the vessels need to be short and the boat capacity needs to be large. 
But as noted, speed limits are low and strictly enforced in Paris. At the same time, land-based 
modes benefit from considerable attention and funding from the public sector. The Grand 
Paris Express project is entirely focused on metro upgrades and extensions with faster trains 
and state-of-the-art stations. The main project goal is to create several interlocking rings 
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which will connect suburban activity centers while bypassing the inner city. The meandering 
Seine and its tributaries are not aligned with the projected Grand Paris Express route.  
A proposal to set up a river ferry service between Saint-Denis and La Défense, two prime 
activity hubs in the northern and western suburbs, became redundant after the approval of a 
new metro line (no. 15) between the two hubs. Given current speed limits for ferries, the 
metro line will provide a much faster service. On the negative side, the projected metro 
construction costs are much higher than the capital costs that a ferry line would have required.  
Finally, tourist boat operators constitute an opposing force too, in the case of Paris. They were 
entirely unenthusiastic about Voguéo’s trial, fearing that, due to its cheap, subsidized tickets, 
Voguéo might attract tourists in addition to commuters, thus reducing their customer base in 
an unfair manner. In fact, the tender failed in part because of anti-lobbying on part of tourist 
boat operators. Similarly, in the short-lived linear ferry system introduced briefly in Shanghai, 
complaints from tourist boat operators were a reason for the lack of institutional support 
(Tanko and Burke 2017). These outcomes highlight the need to involve all stakeholders 
during decision-making processes and to design commuter ferry services in a way that does 
not significantly affect other river operators.  
London has a similar, dense and high-performing land-based public transport network, as well 
as a network of tourist boats. Here too, the rise of the Thames Clippers coincided with the 
launching of the Crossrail project – another mega-project, which will add 118km of rail lines 
by 2026. However, these circumstances did not interfere with the Thames Clippers operations 
because the commuter ferry piers and routes were designed to serve a different set of 
customers. They were complementary rather than in competition with other transport services 
and therefore were integrated into, and supported, the wider network. This points to 
institutional factors at play, which supported the adoption of ferry systems in London and 
acted against those in Paris.  
Lack of Political and Institutional Will 
Participants noted that Parisian politicians and transport authorities lack interests in ferry 
transport. At the regional scale, STIF has set ambitious targets in achieving transport 
sustainability by 2020 (Chakhtoura and Pojani 2016). However, since Voguéo’s 
abandonment, its focus has shifted to other alternative modes, such as cycling, walking, 
carpooling, and carsharing - though ferry-based freight transport is still strongly supported 
(STIF 2012). Similarly, at the local scale, active transport (walking and cycling) rather than 
ferry transport is the focus of sustainability initiatives (Chakhtoura and Pojani 2016). For 
  
13 
example, the City of Paris has been expanding the network of segregated cycling lanes and 
has imposed a car ban along the river banks. This situation illustrates that trials (such as 
Voguéo’s) must be carefully designed to succeed because failure is followed by 
disappointment or loss of faith in a particular project or mode, which is difficult to overcome.  
Another reason for the failure to implement commuter ferry services is the complex and 
multi-layered of transport governance in France. While longstanding transport services (i.e., 
land-based ones) are managed efficiently within the existing system, relatively novel (or 
rediscovered) concepts such as commuter ferry services do not fit well within the existing 
administrative network. For example, the Port de Paris, Voies Navigables de France 
(Navigable Routes of France), and STIF maintain separate operations. As noted, STIF is 
currently focused on the rail-based mega-project Grand Paris Express. The two public 
authorities in charge of the Seine, Port de Paris and Voies Navigables de France deal with 
freight transport and leisure activities. But the official cooperation of these entities would be 
necessary for the construction and maintenance of pier infrastructure and the coordination of 
ferry routes. The land-use department within the City of Paris is also unaccustomed to take 
into consideration river access and ferry routes when determining redevelopment or new-
growth areas. The Métropole du Grand Paris (a new metropolitan body), is still in its infancy. 
Even in the long-term it appears that it will have little power over regional transport planning.  
Interestingly, the concept of using ferries to deliberately connect locations (and potentially 
disadvantaged communities) that are far from existing high-capacity transit lines did not come 
up in the research. This was a clear objective of the New York East River Ferry and Citywide 
Ferry system developments, and an element of their success in both securing ridership and in 
stimulating value uplift (Tanko and Burke 2017).  
By contrast to Paris, the London’s and other cities’ commuter ferry projects benefited from 
strong political leadership and support from the start, which provided credibility and 
momentum (Tanko and Burke 2017). In 1981, governmental impetus led to the formation of 
the London Docklands Development Corporation (a quasi-autonomous non-governmental 
organization), which was instrumental in regenerating the depressed Docklands area of east 
London. While initially controversial, today it is generally regarded as an exemplar of large-
scale regeneration. Infill development in the Docklands, in the absence of many transit 
options, made ferry services not only desirable but absolutely necessary. Other clear evidence 
of institutional and political support appeared in 1997, when John Prescott, the Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions at the time, launched the Thames 2000 
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plan. At a cost of £21 million, the initial plan aimed at regenerating the river and its 
surroundings and promoting it as a key transport artery. It financed the construction of five 
piers, as well as the Millennium Dome – now the O2 Arena (Long Branch 2016; Buchanan et 
al. 2010).  
In 2013, Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London at the time, acted as a “political champion” by 
launching the River Action Plan. This was the first time that an official transport plan was 
entirely dedicated to the river. It set a clear target of 12 million passenger journeys by 2020 
(including leisure tours), as well as the principal actions needed to reach this target, including 
pier construction, passenger information, and integration with the existing transport network. 
It also allocated a fund of £10 million for improvements. The plan enabled public and private 
stakeholders to coordinate and align their interests, as it was closely linked to the broader 
economic plan for London. For example, riverside “Opportunity Areas” as designated in the 
Mayoral Plan are expected to add 100,000 new homes and 220,000 new jobs by 2031, which 
ferry transport access would benefit in a major way (TL 2013).  
Moreover, major efforts at institutional coordination have been made in London. As it is often 
the case for other public transport modes, different tasks are overseen by different 
organizations. For example, the London River Services, established in 1998 as a branch of 
Transport for London, overseas the network of river ferry services, the piers, and the ferry 
licensing system. Transport for London owns the piers while Anschutz Entertainment Group, 
a private company, operates the Thames Clippers, as noted. The Port of London Authority is 
responsible for safety and promotion of ferry use (TL 2015a). But since 2009, in preparation 
for the Olympics, these stakeholders, along with representatives from the riparian boroughs, 
have been assembled in the River Concordat Group, a steering group. This has been a major 
step in coordinating services along the river, and it has provided ferry supporters with more 
weight in transactions with land-based operators (TL 2013, 2015b).  
Lack of Opportunity  
In London, two major international events in 2012 had a catalytic role and contributed to 
putting the Thames at the forefront of the political agenda: the Diamond Jubilee of Queen 
Elizabeth II and the Summer Olympics. To celebrate the first, a spectacular parade of 670 
boats was organized which kindled the interest of the public in river transport. Later that year, 
a vast number of spectators (up to 50,000 per day) travelled to the Olympic venues via the 
Thames (TL 2013). The Olympic Delivery Authority integrated river services into its 
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transport plan for the event and subsidized the development of new pier infrastructure in 
London (ODA 2012). Ferry supporters capitalized on the enthusiasm surroundings these 
events, and the landmark River Action Plan was launched the following year.  
In Paris, such opportunity has not presented itself yet but respondents suggested that it might 
in the mid-term future: the city might host the 2025 Universal Exhibition and the 2024 
Summer Olympics (the two bids are ongoing). The local Olympic committee has proposed to 
locate the venue 7km north of the inner city, with access to the river, while all proposed sites 
for the Universal Exhibition are in proximity of water bodies.  
Local Legislation  
As mentioned, the respondents identified French rules regarding ferry speed limits as a barrier 
that prevents any system from being competitive (STIF 2012). The original purpose of the 
speed limits was to ensure that a variety of activities could be accommodated along the Seine. 
These restrictions were also meant to ensure safety of navigation and shoreline preservation 
(wash from vessels). However, the limit was set at a much lower level than in other ferry 
systems and has not been adjusted since (see Table 1). In Brisbane, the on-water speed 
restrictions in were lifted significantly to allow the local ferry system to be introduced, with 
the vessels proving to be low wash at high speed (Tanko and Burke 2017).  
Another temporary barrier in Paris is a requirement for all vessels and piers to be 
handicapped-accessible. (This requirement applies to all other transport modes since 2005.) 
While universal design is crucial, the infrastructure has yet to be upgraded. Much of the 
existing infrastructure does not comply in full with the law and is therefore unusable (CERTU 
2012). Finally, restricted navigation during floods, which are becoming more frequent with 
climate change, weakens the viability of ferries as a commuter transport mode (PP 2009). 
While French legislation is too rigid, London authorities have been more flexible, have 
adjusted regulations, and embraced opportunities as they have arisen, making improvements 
and upgrades to infrastructure along the way.  
Technical Issues 
Some respondents pointed to technical difficulties in increasing ferry traffic along the Seine. 
In the Greater Paris region, six locks preclude smooth navigation and limit the choice of 
routes. Additionally, the river already accommodates numerous activities, including freight 
transport, nautical sports, and tourist cruises, while the riverbanks accommodate housing, 
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commerce, and industries. The piers are already operating almost at capacity. Faced with 
increased demand for leisure activities, the Port de Paris has upgraded the pier facilities in 
recent years but further improvements are needed (PP 2009). However, the London case 
demonstrates that technical issues are among the easiest to resolve, given sufficient funding 
and political and institutional will. Cohabitation of different activities on large rivers such as 
the Seine or Thames has been possible all along history. Previous studies confirm this 
observation (Tanko and Burke 2017).  
V. Conclusion  
The timing may be propitious for the introduction of commuter ferry services in Paris (given 
future mega-events and the ongoing Grand Paris Express project – which however, has no 
consideration for links with the waterway). But many barriers persist. Funding constraints are 
exacerbated by the inability or unwillingness of the public sector to seek private sector 
funding. The competition between ferries and land-based modes is fierce and unequitable. 
Strict local regulations force ferry operators to maintain low speeds and thus be even less 
competitive vis-à-vis rail. Political and institutional support of ferry transport has not been 
forthcoming, nor has it been spurred by opportunities such as major sport or culture events. 
Finally, some technical issues are present, having to do with the traffic volume on the river 
and the state of ferry transport infrastructure.  
As the literature and the London benchmark case illustrates, these barriers are not 
insurmountable. However, it is well possible that the best location for commuter ferry services 
is not the Paris core, as in the failed Voguéo attempt, but rather suburban areas, especially 
those which have been identified as future development clusters in the Grand Paris Express 
project. However, this concept would require in-depth economic, environmental, and social 
impacts studies. More generally, additional research on European river ferry services is 
necessary. Large cities, in particular, which suffer from congestion the most, need to become 
better acquainted with each other’s’ successes and failures in order to fulfil the potential of 
their river assets.  
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Appendix  
Survey questions:  
 Over the last years, Paris has developed river-based transport for tourists and more recently freight. 
Why not passenger/commuter service?  
 What are the main barriers? Please discuss issues related to cost, technical design, user perceptions.  
 How about opportunities? Do you think there are good opportunities for river-based transport services 
in Paris?  
 Why is river-based public transport absent from the Grand Paris Express (the new masterplan)? 
 When it comes to river-based public transport, does Paris have a role model or benchmark city (in 
Europe or further afield)?  
 Have you looked at how London set up a river-based public transport system? Why or why not?  
 If yes: what information and/or exchange activities have taken place? Which agencies were involved? 
Will there be follow-up activities? Please explain.  
 What is specific to Paris compared to other cities with river based public transport services?  
 What some of the difficulties that river-based public transport presents in terms of infrastructure and 
operations? Can these be overcome?  
 What are some of the advantages of river-based public transport in comparison to other modes? Please 
discuss issues of cost, time savings, pollution, etc. 
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  
